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Comment
The Younger Abstention Doctrine: Bleak
Prospects for Federal Intervention in
Pending State Proceedings
I. INTRODUCTION
Younger v. Harris' and its companion cases2 have established a
policy of abstention emanating from the concept of Federalism. "Our
Federalism" mandates that federal courts respect the proper functions
of state courts in order to avoid creating unnecessary friction with the
states.' Under the Younger abstention doctririe a federal court ordin-
arily is precluded from enjoining a state court proceeding where the
federal petitioner has an adequate opportunity to litigate his federal
claim in the state system.4 Federal equitable relief is available in the
absence of a pending state proceeding or where the underlying state
suit does not trigger the application of the notions of comity and
federalism attendant to the Younger abstention doctrine., Additionally,
extraordinary circumstances which create the threat of great and im-
mediate irreparable harm are recognized exceptions to the Younger
abstention doctrine."
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam).
3. 401 U.S. at 44-45. Justice Black explained the meaning of the term "Federalism"
as follows:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Govern-
ment and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept
does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests
of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan,
"Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, oc-
cupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
Id.
4. Id. at 49.
5. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal declaratory relief ap-
propriate in absence of pending state proceeding). See also note 30 infra.
6. 401 U.S. at 45.
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An evaluation of the prospects for federal injunctive or declaratory
relief entails a two-step analysis: first, determining the applicability of
Younger principles to the state suit at hand and, second, examining the
particular facts of the case to determine if one of the recognized excep-
tions to the Younger abstention doctrine is present. In the course of
this two-step analysis, this writing will analyze the fundamental
policies underlying the Younger abstention doctrine; the principal ob-
jective being an evaluation of the continued utility of judicially
recognized areas of permissible federal relief. The development of the
Younger abstention doctrine will be traced from its predecessor, Dom-
browski v. Pfister," to its present state. This comment will identify the
obstacles confronting a federal petitioner seeking equitable relief
against either a threatened or pending state court proceeding. The ap-
plicability of Younger principles to criminal prosecutions and civil pro-
ceedings will be discussed with emphasis on the policy foundations of
comity and federalism. Focus will then shift to the utility of the
recognized exceptions as a means of securing a federal forum once
Younger principles are operative. Finally, this comment will briefly
suggest an alternative approach to determining whether federal in-
tervention is appropriate, based on the weighing of the interests of the
federal petitioner against the actual affront to the state occasioned by
the granting of equitable relief.
II. BACKGROUND: YOUNGER AND ITS PROGENY
Prior to Younger, the principles enunciated in Dombrowski v.
Pfister8 controlled the accessibility of the federal courts for the ad-
judication of constitutional issues and the granting of injunctive relief
against pending or threatened state court prosecutions. Under Dom-
browski, a federal petitioner could obtain equitable relief from a
threatened state prosecution merely by establishing that the state
statute which formed the basis of the threatened action produced a
"chilling effect" on the exercise of his individual constitutional liber-
ties.'
7. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Id. In Dombrowski a civil rights organization sought injunctive and declaratory
relief to restrain state and local enforcement authorities from instituting a state prosecu-
tion under the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Com-
munist Propaganda Control Law as violative of first amendment guarantees. Id. at 482.
9. Id. at 494. The Dombrowski reasoning was based on the preferred status and im-
portance afforded first amendment guarantees and was extended to authorize injunctive
relief against pending state prosecutions where the state statute was found to have a
"chilling effect" on the petitioner's first amendment rights. See Honey v. Goodman, 432
F.2d 333, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1970) (federal equitable relief appropriate to enjoin state court
prosecution where petitioner establishes that state authorities undertook prosecution to
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The liberal teachings of Dombrowski were all but eliminated by the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Younger v. Harris."0 In Younger
the defendant was the subject of a state court prosecution under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act.1' The defendant petitioned the
federal courts to enjoin the pending state prosecution," citing Dom-
browski as the controlling precedent.' 3 A federal district court in
California agreed with the petitioner and granted the requested relief,
holding the California statute unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.'4
On direct appeal,'5 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
district court and held that the lower court should have abstained
under traditional equitable concepts.'" The majority concluded that the
petitioner had failed to establish the requisite great and immediate ir-
reparable harm warranting injunctive relief.' The Court stated,
however, that the necessary irreparable harm may be shown even
though the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment are absent;
for example, where a state statute is flagrantly violative of express
constitutional prohibitions.'"
The Younger Court expressly left unresolved 9 the question of
whether the Federal Anti-Injunction Act" barred a federal action
chill free expression of unpopular ideas); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir.
1969) (injunctive relief available to enjoin prosecution of petitioners under statute unduly
prohibiting picketing where statute infringes upon first amendment rights).
10. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11402 (West 1970).
12. Harris sought an injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Harris v.
Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. 281 F. Supp. at 509-10.
14. Id. at 516.
15. Direct appeal was accomplished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976) (repealed
1978), which provided in pertinent part: "[A]ny party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting... an ... injunction in any.., action ... required by an Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
16. 401 U.S. at 54. See note 3 supra.
17. 401 U.S. at 48-49.
18. Id. at 53-54. Mere facial invalidity of a statute is insufficient to warrant federal in-
junctive relief. Id. at 54.
19. The majority stated:
Because our holding.rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable
principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether
28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings "ex-
cept as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" would in and of itself be controll-
ing under the circumstances of this case.
Id.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2283 as
1981
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 The following year, in Mitchum v. Foster,'
the Supreme Court addressed this question and held that a section
1983 action is a legislative exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, and is
not barred.23 The Court reasoned that the predecessor 24 to section 1983
was enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment
against any state action including state judicial action.25 Traditionally,
state action was thought to include only legislative acts or statutes
rather than actions involving the state judicial process.28 The Mitchum
Court stated that section 1983 permitted "suits in equity" among the
various remedies available to protect citizens from unconstitutional ac-
tions under color of state law.' Thus, the Court concluded, section 1983
was intended as an express authorization from Congress to grant in-
junctive relief against pending state proceedings and, therefore, was
not barred by the federal Anti-Injunction Act.'
The next development in the Younger abstention doctrine focused
on the pendency of a state action as a prerequisite for invoking con-
siderations of Younger principles. In Steffel v. Thompson,' the
an absolute ban against federal injunctions of pending state court proceedings absent one
of the legislative exceptions. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
'Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
The petitioning of a federal court to enjoin a pending state court action is ordinarily
proscribed by the Anti-Injunction Act. An injunction may be granted, however, where ex-
pressly authorized by act of Congress, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to be such an authorization. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text in-
fra. In summary, the relationship of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Younger abstention
doctrine with regard to section 1983 actions is: (1) the Act forbids the enjoining of pending
state court actions except as authorized by Congress; (2) section 1983 is viewed as a con-
gressionally authorized exception; but (3) though permitted by the Anti-Injunction Act, an
injunction sought under section 1983 may be barred by Younger.
21. Section 1983 in pertinent part provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
22. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum local prosecuting authorities sought to close down
the federal petitioner's book store under a Florida public nuisance law. Id. at 227.
23. Id. at 242-43.
24. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873).
25. 407 U.S. at 240.
26. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
27. 407 U.S. at 242.
28. Id. at 243. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, however, reiterated the
Younger concerns of comity and federalism which ordinarily restrain a federal court from
enjoining a pending state prosecution. Id. at 243-44 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
29. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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Supreme Court was faced with the propriety of allowing federal
declaratory relief in response to a threatened criminal prosecution in
the state system. The Court sanctioned this limited form of federal
relief by finding that the considerations of comity and federalism are
not operative in the absence of a pending state proceeding." The Stef-
fel rationale was later employed to permit the granting of a
preliminary injunction against a threatened but not pending state pros-
ecution. 1
These early developments in the Younger abstention doctrine oc-
curred exclusively within the context of state criminal prosecutions. A
significant change in the doctrine occurred when the Supreme Court
extended application of the concepts of federalism and comity to a civil
proceeding in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.32 In Huffman municipal
authorities initiated a civil action against a theatre owner under a
state obscenity statute. The owner petitioned a federal court for
equitable relief claiming that the Ohio nuisance statute was unconstitu-
tional.' Relief was granted at the trial level but was denied by the
Supreme Court on appeal. The Court, although alluding to the "quasi-
criminal" character of the challenged statute, premised its ruling on
the importance of the state interests involved.' The Court held that
the notions of comity and federalism are equally applicable to civil pro-
ceedings as well as criminal prosecutions. The Huffman ruling clarified
the policy behind Younger by holding that the appropriate focus of in-
quiry in deciding the applicability of Younger principles is not the
criminal nature of the pending state suit but the importance of the
state's interest in the underlying litigation. 5 The Huffman majority
concluded by stating that Younger principles were in full force where
the federal petitioner had not exhausted his state appellate remedies
prior to seeking federal injunctive relief.
30. Id. at 462. The majority stated:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is
filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disrup-
tion of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that cir-
cumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles.
Id.
31. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (preliminary injunction available
to restrain threatened prosecution of tavern owner under local obscenity statute). See
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (federal petitioner not required to exhaust
state appellate remedies where petition does not seek to remedy consequences of past
convictions but rather is aimed at securing "wholly prospective" relief).
32. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id. at 604.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 609. But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and note 31 supra.
1981
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The Supreme Court's next involvement with the Younger abstention
doctrine came later that same year in Hicks v. Miranda.7 The issue
presented concerned the procedural rather than the substantive
aspects of the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court was faced with
determining when a state proceeding was "pending" for purposes of
applying Younger principles. The Hicks Court concluded that a state
action was deemed pending if it was begun prior to the time any pro-
ceedings on the merits had taken place in the action filed in the federal
court. 8
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have continued the trend of
limiting the availability of the federal forum, by broadening the scope
of the Younger abstention doctrine and repeatedly refusing to sanction
the granting of equitable relief by a federal district court against a
pending state suit. 9 As a result, the federal petitioner is forced to
litigate his federal claims in the state court system.
37. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Hicks local officials seized copies of an allegedly obscene
film from the federal petitioner's theatre and filed criminal charges against two theatre
employees. The federal petitioners sought injunctive relief against future prosecution
under the obscenity statute in federal district court. One day after the federal petition
was filed, the state complaint was amended to include the petitioners as defendants.
38. Id. at 349. The Hicks ruling was intended to preclude a race to the courthouse by
the federal petitioner in an effort to avoid the application of Younger principles. Thus,
even though no state criminal complaint had been filed against the federal petitioner,
Younger principles were applicable since no proceedings on the merits had taken place in
the federal forum. Id.
Instead of avoiding the race to the courthouse, the Hicks ruling may have merely
changed the rules of the race by eliminating the federal petitioner as a contestant. Once
the federal petition is filed, the state authorities have until the day proceedings on the
merits commence in federal court to counter by filing a state action. The race is thus
limited to one contestant, the state prosecuting authority, and it has a more clearly de-
fined time period within which to act. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 354 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (It]he rule the Court adopts today, however, does not eliminate that race; it
merely permits the State to leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first at
the finish line").
39. In Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), the Court concluded that vindication of a
state's contempt powers was of sufficient moment to trigger Younger principles. Id. at
335. The majority stated that federal intervention into a pending state civil proceeding in
which the federal petitioners could have asserted their federal claims would offend the
state's legitimate interest in the administration of its judicial system and reflect nega-
tively on the state court's ability to enforce constitutional guarantees. Id. at 335-36. Finally,
the Court pointed to the petitioners' failure to avail themselves of the opportunities to
assert their federal rights in the state proceedings and the absence of any of the re-
cognized exceptions as establishing the adequacy of the state proceedings and the ap-
propriateness of equitable restraint. Id. at 337-38.
In Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), the Court found that the state's interest
in enforcing the fiscal integrity of its welfare assistance program was of sufficient
magnitude to call into play the notions of comity and federalism of the Younger absten-
tion doctrine. Id. at 444. The Court relied on the state's presence as a party in the state
suit and its option of bringing a criminal prosecution instead of a civil action as
318 Vol. 19:313
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III. PROSPECTS FOR RELIEF IN A FEDERAL FORUM
A. Absence of a Pending State Proceeding
A logical and convenient starting point for an evaluation of the pros-
pects for federal relief is where there is no suit pending in the state
system. The pendency of a state court action is often viewed as the
fundamental prerequisite to invoking the Younger abstention
doctrine. 0 Because the genesis of the Younger abstention doctrine was
in the concepts of comity and federalism, there is little concern for in-
fringing upon the proper functions of the state courts in the absence of
a pending state proceeding. This rationale was advanced by the Court
in Steffel to justify the granting of declaratory relief to the federal
petitioner who was not party to any pending state court proceeding."1
Where the request for declaratory or injunctive relief entails the in-
terpretation of a recently enacted state statute, however, an additional
parameter emerges. Federal courts may be precluded from granting
equitable relief under the Pullman"2 abstention doctrine which is
premised on the belief that if the dispute before the federal court may
be resolved on a point involving the interpretation of state law, the
need for a federal court ruling on the statute's constitutionality is ob-
viated. Further, the Pullman Court noted that the states' supreme
courts are entrusted with the responsibility of having the final word
on the construction of their own laws and, therefore, a federal district
court's interpretation would be in the nature of an advisory opinion. 3
manifesting the importance of the state's interests. Id. In concluding that federal absten-
tion was proper, the majority held that prehearing deprivation of property without notice
did not create the necessary great and immediate irreparable injury warranting equitable
relief, provided that the state proceedings offered the federal petitioners an opportunity
to raise the due process claim. Id. at 447. On remand, the district court concluded that the
petitioners could not have raised their constitutional due process claim in the state pro-
ceedings. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 951 (1979).
The Supreme Court's latest encounter with the Younger abstention doctrine occurred
in Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), where the Court viewed a state's interest in
overseeing the enforcement of its child abuse statute as of sufficient importance to invoke
consideration of Younger principles. Id. at 432. The Moore Court likened the child abuse
statute to the public nuisance statute at issue in Huffman. Id. at 423. Finally, the majority
held that, absent a recognized exception to Younger, a federal court must refrain from en-
joining a pending state proceeding where the petitioner has an available procedural
device to raise his federal claims in the state action. Id. at 430-31.
40. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 234 (3d ed. 1976).
41. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 462.
42. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
43. Id. at 498-501. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974). Under the Pullman absten-
tion doctrine, the federal court is required only to stay its jurisdiction pending the out-
come of the state suit. Conversely, the Younger abstention doctrine mandates outright
dismissal of the federal petition. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1043 (2d ed. 1973).
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Consequently, even though no state suit is pending and only
declaratory relief is sought, the federal petitioner may be forced to
litigate his constitutional claims in state court.
The Pullman policies were considered in Moore v. Sims" which in-
volved a federal district court's enjoining of Texas state court actions.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated initially that the
petitioners' action represented broad, novel challenges to interrelated
parts of the Texas child abuse statute.45 The Moore Court traced the
evolution of the Pullman abstension doctrine by citing the policy
behind it.4" In particular, the Court observed that Pullman was designed
to avoid the needless friction between federal and state systems that a
premature injunction may create. In the Court's view, as the constitu-
tional challenge to the state statute becomes broader, the possibility of
friction becomes greater and Pullman principles become more impor-
tant." Although not dispositive of the Moore case, Pullman considera-
tions no doubt militated against federal intervention.48 In summary,
even though no state suit is pending, under Pullman principles the
petitioner may be denied the opportunity to litigate his constitutional
challenges to a state statute in a federal forum.
The Pullman and Younger abstention doctrines can be viewed as
44. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
45. Id. at 418.
46. Id. at 428-29. The Pullman doctrine is based on the concept of federalism and the
desire to avoid the needless adjudication of constitutional issues. Its operation is triggered
where a federal court is called upon to interpret an unsettled area of state law. The con-
cern is that the federal court may erroneously apply or construe state law resulting in the
possible adjudication of a federal question which need not have been decided. Further, the
error may be exposed in a subsequent state court action, thus necessitating a reopening
of the federal case. Accordingly, where uncertainty exists in the state law, a federal court
should avoid ruling on the federal question until the state has had an opportunity to
resolve the state issues. If resort to the state court resolves the conflict, then the federal
court is relieved of the task of adjudicating the constitutional issue since it has become
moot. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Absten-
tion Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077-78 (1974).
47. 442 U.S. at 429. See notes 4244 and accompanying text supra.
48. The Court also stressed that abstention is favored where the broad constitutional
challenges to the state statute may be precluded by a narrowing construction of the
statute in the state courts. 442 U.S. at 429-30. The Court stated:
State courts are the principal expositors of state law. Almost every constitutional
challenge-and particularly one as far ranging as that involved in this case-offers
the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional
problem and intelligently mediate federal constitutional concerns and state in-
terests. When federal courts disrupt that process of mediation while interjecting
themselves in such disputes, they prevent the informed evolution of state policy by
state tribunals.
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methods to reduce the congestion of the federal court docket. 9 The
purpose of the Pullman abstention doctrine is to prevent the needless
federal adjudication of cases involving federal issues which may be
resolved by state courts." Not to be overlooked, however, is the
federal petitioner's right to litigate his federal questions in a federal
forum if resort to the state system does not dispose of the matter.
Under Pullman, federal courts only stay their jurisdiction rather than
dismiss the case outright, essentially guaranteeing the federal peti-
tioner eventual access to the federal courts."1 In other words, Pullman
serves two purposes: alleviating the workload placed on federal courts
by avoiding needless litigation and safeguarding the federal
petitioner's rights by providing federal court resolution of all federal
claims.
The Younger abstention doctrine, on the other hand, reduces the
federal docket at the expense of depriving the petitioner of a federal
forum because the federal court must dismiss the petition rather than
hold it in abeyance.52 This type of forum allocation between the state
and federal systems does not actually reduce litigation since the
federal claims will be adjudicated in the state forum. The only question
is which court shall hear the petitioner's claims.' Moreover, resort to
the federal system can only be had through appeal to the Supreme
Court, and then only after the state appellate remedies have been ex-
hausted. 4 Access to the federal courts under these circumstances is
doubtful at best, in view of the lengthy and costly procedure involved
in exhausting the state appellate process and the remote chances of
having the Supreme Court grant certiorari. Hence, if viewed in terms
of reducing the federal caseload, the Pullman abstention doctrine ac-
complishes this objective while affording some protection to the
federal petitioner but the Younger abstention doctrine does not pro-
vide protection.
Pullman considerations are not the only obstacles blocking access to
the federal courts in the absence of a pending state proceeding; pros-
pects for securing a federal forum are tempered by a consideration of
two additional factors. First, under the Hicks v. Miranda ruling," state
49. See Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1283, 1295 (1977).
50. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
51. See note 43 supra. One commentator, however, has suggested that the Pullman
doctrine invariably leads to delays and excessive costs. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 220 (3d ed. 1976).
52. See note 43 supra.
53. See Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1282 (1977).
54. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
55. See note 38 supra.
1981
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or local authorities can effectively negate the exercise of federal
jurisdiction by instituting a state proceeding before any action on the
merits has transpired in the federal court. 8 Second, even if the state
authorities fail to take advantage of Hicks, the petitioner would be faced
with the burden of establishing standing57 and entitlement to injunc-
tive relief.8 The federal petitioner may have a difficult time proving
great and immediate irreparable harm unless a state suit is imminent,
in which case the petitioner risks the danger that state authorities will
institute a state action prior to any proceedings on the merits on the
federal petition. Accordingly, the federal plaintiff must carefully time
the filing of his federal petition to coincide with his ability to carry the
burden of proof in establishing standing and irreparable injury while
simultaneously minimizing the ever present risk that the state
authorities will pursue action in the state courts.5 9
The Hicks holding is inconsistent with an earlier statement by the
Court in Steffel v. Thompson that federal intervention does not disrupt
the state's legal system when there is no state suit pending "at the
time the federal complaint is filed."' In contravention of the language
of Steffel, the Hicks ruling would prohibit federal intervention after
the filing of the federal complaint so long as no proceedings on the
merits have occurred in the federal forum. The net effect of Hicks is
56. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 353-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Under the
Hicks ruling, the Supreme Court has held that a state suit is deemed "pending" for pur-
poses of the Younger abstention doctrine where the state complaint is filed before any
proceedings on the merits are adjudicated in the federal forum. Id. at 349.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Stewart stated:
The Court's new rule creates a reality which few state prosecutors can be expected
to ignore. It is an open invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in
order to defeat federal jurisdiction. One need not impugn the motives of state of-
ficials to suppose that they would rather prosecute a criminal suit in state court
than defend a civil case in a federal forum. Today's opinion virtually instructs state
officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments.
Id. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
57. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 428-29. In Moore the Court alluded to the peti-
tioners' possible lack of standing to contest the statutorily authorized pre-seizure in-
vestigative procedures which had not yet been undertaken. Id. at 428-29 & n.ll. The
Court also questioned the assertion that the proper standard of proof for a proceeding
determining parental rights was "clear and convincing evidence." Since the state pro-
ceeding had not reached the point of evaluating the parental rights the majority con-
cluded that the federal petitioners could not demonstrate any actual injury. Id. at 429.
58. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 46.
59. The federal petitioner is caught between the "Scylla" of initiating a premature
suit and weakening his chances for success and the "Charybdis" of postponing his federal
suit and risking the chance that state authorities may bring a state action. See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977).
60. 415 U.S. at 462.
61. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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the reduction of the availability of federal injunctive relief against
threatened state suits and the narrowing of the protections afforded in
Steffel 2 After Hicks, state or local authorities need only initiate state
proceedings against the federal petitioner after receiving notice of the
federal suit but prior to any hearings on the merits in the federal
forum.'
B. Pendency of a State Suit
Once a proceeding is pending in the state court system, the ap-
plicability of Younger principles must be determined." Although
Younger principles were formulated in the context of a criminal pros-
ecution, their applicability also must be analyzed in civil proceedings. 5
The Huffman decision demonstrates that the basic .concepts of comity
and federalism, not the existence of criminal overtones, determine the
applicability of the Younger abstention doctrine." More simply, it is
the importance of the state's role in the pending litigation that must
be examined; the greater the legitimate interests of the state, the
greater the interests the state courts have in adjudicating the matter.67
The state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws traditionally has
been construed as one of the highest order and has proven sufficient in
itself to invoke consideration of Younger principles. 8 In criminal cases,
the Court has proceeded directly to the examination of the facts of the
62. 415 U.S. at 462.
63. See note 56 supra.
64. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
65. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)(component of Younger
abstention doctrine which rests upon the threat to federal system is equally applicable to
civil proceedings).
66. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), where the majority stated:
We now hold, however, that the principles of Younger and Huffman are not con-
fined solely to the types of state actions which were sought to be enjoined in those
cases. As we emphasized in Huffman, the "'more vital consideration'" behind the
Younger doctrine of nonintervention lay not in the fact that the state criminal pro-
cess was involved but rather in
"'the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.'"
Id. at 334 (citations omitted).
67. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 55 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975). See also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at
356 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A State has a vital interest in the enforcement of its
criminal law, and this Court has said time and again that it will sanction little federal in-
terference with that important state function").
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case to ascertain if federal equitable relief is warranted under any of
the recognized exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine.69
Civil proceedings, on the other hand, require an additional inquiry to
determine the applicability of the Younger abstention doctrine. The
Court has acknowledged that not every civil proceeding necessarily
triggers application of the doctrine." When presented with the task of
deciding whether to apply Younger to a civil proceeding, however, the
Supreme Court has generally found that deference to the proper func-
tions of the state courts is appropriate.7' Unfortunately, in reaching
this conclusion the Court has neglected to enumerate the formal
criteria necessary to measure the importance of the state's interest.
Nevertheless, two basic indicia are discernable from the opinions of
the Supreme Court. The first is whether the state is a party to the
pending state proceedings.2 The state's involvement indicates an im-
portant state interest in the proceedings and militates in favor of
deferring resolution of the dispute to the state courts.73 Cases involv-
ing the Younger abstention doctrine arise most frequently in situations
where a federal petitioner challenges the constitutionality of a state
statute." The petitioner is invariably prosecuted under a penal enact-
ment or enforcement proceedings are instituted against him pursuant
to a civil statute. Consequently, the state is, almost without exception,
a party to the state proceedings and its presence is manifested as the
complaining party. Even in the rare instance where the state was not a
party to the pending state action, the Supreme Court has concluded
that Younger principles were applicable. 5
The second factor in the applicability of the Younger abstention doc-
trine is the subject matter sought to be regulated by the state statute.
The degree to which the subject matter affects the public interest
determines the interest of the state. This factor, though given only
cursory discussion, usually provides the basis for the Court's conclu-
sion that Younger principles are in force.
69. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322 (1975). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (federal intervention into state pretrial hearings appropriate since injunc-
tive relief was not addressed to a pending state proceeding and, therefore, would not in-
terfere with a state criminal prosecution).
70. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 607.
71. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
72. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 423.
73. Id.
74. See 5 OHIo N. UNIV. L. REV. 658, 661-62 (1978).
75. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
76. The Supreme Court has found the civil statutes in the following cases of suffi-
cient importance to the states' interests to trigger operation of Younger principles: Moore
v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (child abuse statute); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977)
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Although the Court has expressly left open the question of whether
Younger principles apply to all civil litigation," the Court may have im-
plicitly answered this question in the affirmative through its decisions.
The Supreme Court has consistently found the civil cases before it are
subject to Younger considerations." The Court has almost exclusively
devoted its attention to evaluating the interests of the state and has
focused on the notions of comity and federalism 9 while virtually ignor-
ing the competing interests of the federal petitioner 0 in securing a
federal forum for the vindication of his constitutional rights. Mitchum
v. Foster presented a suitable vehicle for promoting the interests of
the federal petitioner.2 Although Mitchum may be cited for the pro-
position that a federal court should weigh the federal interests in pro-
viding a federal forum for the litigation of section 1983 actions, 3 post-
Mitchum decisions have failed to develop the Mitchum reasoning and
acknowledge the same vital interest of the federal petitioner.8 '
Federal courts were created for the adjudication of federal claims
and their abstaining indicates an insensitivity to their responsibilities. 5
(welfare fraud statute); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (contempt enforcement statute);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (obscenity or public nuisance statute).
77. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 607 ("For purposes of the case before us,
however, we need make no general pronouncements upon the application of Younger to
all civil litigation").
78. The sharpest attack against this expansion of the Younger abstention doctrine
has come from dissenting Justices. In Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), Justice
Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, stated: "Even assuming that federal abstention might con-
ceivably be appropriate in some civil cases, the transformation of what I must think can
only be an exception into an absolute rule crosses the line between abstention and abdica-
tion." Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan later stated that "the Court's
silence, and its insistence upon compliance with the literal words of Watson v. Buck, only
confirms my conviction that the Court is determined to extend to 'state civil proceedings
generally the holding of Younger,' and to give its exceptions the narrowest possible
reach." Id. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), stated: "It has never
been suggested that every pending proceeding between a state and a federal plaintiff
justifies abstention unless one of the exceptions to Younger applies." Id. at 435-36
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See note 66 supra.
80. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 423; Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 444;
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 337; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 604.
81. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 355-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting); and text accom-
panying note 84 infra. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Pro-
tections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 250 (1974).
82. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint- A
Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523, 540-41.
84. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 355-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
85. See id. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Hicks stated:
The duty of the federal courts to adjudicate and vindicate federal constitutional
1981
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A factor militating against this proposition, however, is the Supremacy.
Clause of the United States Constitution which imposes the constitu-
tional responsibilities on state court judges as well as federal court
judges.86 Still, the availability of the federal forum would serve to ex-
pedite the claims of the petitioner, but this alone has not proved a suf-
ficient reason to sanction the granting of equitable relief in the face of
a pending state action. 7 The dominant role the state's interest plays in
the Court's analysis coupled with the seeming neglect of the
petitioner's interests by the Court is strong evidence that the proper
inquiry in determining the applicability of Younger principles is not a
balancing of competing interests but rather a one-sided examination
tailored to the presence of the state's interest." The result is that the
federal petitioner is burdened with the almost insurmountable task of
arguing the impropriety of applying Younger principles to the pending
state suit.
C. The Younger Exceptions
1. Bad Faith
The Younger Court has set forth three instances in which federal in-
rights is, of course, shared with state courts, but there can be no doubt that the
federal courts are "the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right
given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." The statute
under which this action was brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, established in our law "the
role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power." Indeed, "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people." And this central interest of a federal court as
guarantor of constitutional rights is fully implicated from the moment its jurisdic-
tion is invoked.
The Court today, however, goes much further than simply recognizing the right
of the State to proceed with the orderly administration of its criminal law; it ousts
the federal courts from their historic role as the "primary reliances" for vindicating
constitutional freedoms. This is no less offensive to "Our Federalism" than the
federal injunction restraining pending state criminal proceedings condemned in
Younger v. Harris. The concept of federalism requires "sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments." Younger v. Harris and its com-
panion cases reflect the principles that the federal judiciary must refrain from in-
terfering with the legitimate functioning of state courts. But surely the converse is
a principle no less valid.
Id. (citations omitted).
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the
laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby .. "
87. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 608-10.
88. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of
Younger v. Harris reflects an accomodation of competing interests. The rule announced
today distorts that balance beyond recognition").
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junctive relief would be appropriate notwithstanding the pendency of a
state court proceeding and the applicability of Younger principles. The
first of these exceptions involves a state suit undertaken in bad faith
with the intent to harass the petitioner. 9 Bad faith can be established
by demonstrating that the state prosecution was conducted without
hope of obtaining a valid conviction." The showing of bad faith on the
part of the state in instituting the suit is the equivalent of establishing
great and immediate irreparable injury.9" The rationale advanced in
support of permitting federal intervention under these circumstances
is that the state does not possess a legitimate interest in pursuing a
bad faith prosecution and consequently, the notions of federalism and
comity are not violated by the federal intervention.2 The most patent
example of bad faith is one in which the federal petitioner is subject to
repeated state prosecutions, each emanating from the same act by the
petitioner. 3 Under these conditions, the federal petitioner could not rely
on his defense to a single state prosecution to vindicate his constitu-
tional rights, a requisite for abstention under Younger." The existence
of bad faith through multiple prosecutions is illustrated by Shaw v.
Garrison," where the federal petitioner was unsuccessfully prosecuted
in state court on charges of conspiracy to assassinate President Ken-
nedy. Subsequently, Shaw was prosecuted for perjury in connection
with his testimony during the conspiracy trial. The defendant petitioned
a federal district court for a temporary restraining order which was
granted to halt the perjury prosecution. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the lower court's decision on the basis that the petitioner had
established bad faith by showing that he was subjected to multiple
prosecutions and demonstrating a serious risk of exposure to future
prosecutions for a single event.
89. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 49.
90. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (federal injunctive relief appropriate only
where petitioner is subjected to bad faith prosecution or in other extraordinary cir-
cumstances creating the requisite irreparable harm).
91. Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972)
(bad faith prosecution is sufficient though not necessary in establishing irreparable
injury).
92. Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1383 (5th Cir. 1979) (abstention by federal
court does not deprive petitioner of protection not available in state court where prosecu-
tion is brought in good faith).
93. See Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d at 116-117.
94. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 46 ("The threat to the plaintiffs federally pro-
tected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution").
95. 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 114.
97. Id. at 122. In Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971), the federal petitioner
was convicted of simple battery in state court. His conviction was vacated by the
1981
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Despite its apparent utility, the bad faith exception has its limita-
tions. The most noticeable aspect of the cases finding bad faith is the
absence of a Supreme Court opinion among them." Although the Court
has devoted considerable time and attention to discussion of the bad
faith concept,99 it has not reviewed a single case to emphasize the im-
portance of the exception.
Another element qualifying the utility of the bad faith exception
deals with the type of conduct found to create the necessary bad faith.
In Shaw and similar cases"' the federal petitioners were all subject to
multiple or repeated prosecutions for a single act. This is not to sug-
gest that bad faith can only be established by showing multiple state
prosecutions. On the contrary, a single state prosecution undertaken in
bad faith or with the intent to harass may form the basis for granting
federal equitable relief."' What is suggested is that it is easier to prove
the requisite great and immediate irreparable injury by showing a
scheme or a risk of future prosecution for the same act."2 Further, bad
faith implies a subjective intent on the part of state officials in the per-
formance of their duties in undertaking the action.03 The subjective in-
tent can be more easily established where there has been a series of
state suits against the federal petitioner, each undertaken 'without the
hope of obtaining a valid conviction."4 Accordingly, the federal peti-
tioner may find it more difficult to prove bad faith where he has not
been the subject of repeated state actions.
A final observation about the continued utility of the bad faith ex-
ception is that its presence has been confined exclusively to criminal
settings."5 Although the Court has displayed a willingness to at least
Supreme Court on grounds that his right to a jury trial was denied. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968). The state attempted to retry the petitioner on the same charge of
simple battery. The plaintiff petitioned for and was granted injunctive relief by a federal
district court after a finding that the petitioner was subject to multiple arrests and ex-
cessive bail rates. 445 F.2d at 559. The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, concurred with the
district court in its finding that the state prosecution was conducted in bad faith and
made with the intent to harass the petitioner. Id. at n.3.
See also Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975) (federal equitable relief
available to enjoin criminal prosecutions of state prisoners where their indictments were
based substantially on the same charges that had already been dismissed against them).
98. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (Supreme Court remanded case to
lower court to determine whether state prosecution was pending and if so, whether it was
brought in bad faith).
99. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
100. See note 97 and text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
101. Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1381 (5th Cir. 1979).
102. See note 97 supra.
103. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1115 (1977).
104. See note 97 supra.
105. Both cases discussed in note 97 supra arose as criminal prosecutions.
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consider the possibility of bad faith existing in civil cases,' so far it
has not permitted federal intervention under this exception in a non-
criminal state proceeding. The reason may be that there was no bad
faith on the state authorities' part in any of the civil cases. It also may
be attributable to the difference in sanctions that the federal peti-
tioner faces in the two types of proceedings. ' Accordingly, it may
take a more outrageous abuse of the civil system in order to create the
requisite bad faith or intent to harass. Additionally, the federal
judiciary may scrutinize the situation more closely where the federal
petitioner faces greater penalties. The cumulative effect is that
although bad faith has been found to exist, its presence has been
generally limited to instances of multiple criminal prosecutions and
even then only in rare circumstances. 8
2. Flagrant Statutes
Another judicially recognized exception to the Younger abstention
doctrine permits federal intervention into a pending state proceeding
brought under a statute that is "flagrantly violative of express con-
stitutional prohibitions." ''0 The justification for this exception is the
absence of a legitimate state interest in enforcing an unconstitutional
statute." Alternatively it has been suggested that attempts to enforce
a flagrantly unconstitutional statute manifests bad faith on the part of
state authorities.' By demonstrating that the statute is flagrantly un-
constitutional, the federal petitioner establishes the requisite great
and immediate irreparable injury entitling him to federal equitable
relief."1 This is not easy: a mere showing that the state statute is un-
constitutional on its face or that its existence creates a chilling effect
on the exercise of first amendment rights is insufficient. 3 The
Younger Court, in rejecting the Dombrowski standard for enjoining en-
forcement of a state statute, expressed a serious concern about allow-
ing courts unlimited power to pass judgment on statutes."' The Court
106. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 432.
107. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1205-06 (1972) (opinion in chambers by
Rehnquist, J.).
108. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra. See also Johnson v. McNary, 414
F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Luongo v. Wenzel, 404 F. Supp. 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stewart
v. Dameron, 345 F. Supp. 1086 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 474 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1973).
109. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402
(1941)).
110. See, e.g., Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d at 1383 & n.14.
111. See 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1212, 1230 (1977).
112. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54.
113. See id. at 54 (possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not in
itself justify an injunction).
114. Id. at 52. The majority stated:
The power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional are in the
1981 329
Duquesne Law Review
reasoned that the remoteness of controversies not before the court,
coupled with the impact on the legislative process occasioned by en-
joining all enforcement of the statute, would be an unacceptable pro-
cess for deciding constitutional questions.'
The petitioner's heavy burden is indicated by the absolute standard
of the language of the exception. The statute must be found to be
"flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions
in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.""' 6 It is hardly
conceivable that any state legislature could enact a statute repugnant
to this degree. Further, most constitutional challenges are directed only
towards a portion of a statutory scheme."" Even conceding that a
statute may possibly qualify under this exception, the federal court
may not be permitted the opportunity to make this determination.
Pullman considerations may again surface to preclude the granting of
equitable relief by deferring the matter to the state courts."8
Arguably, the statute may be susceptible of a narrow construction by
the state court to avoid its apparent unconstitutional effect and even if
not, the state court may be the desirable forum for invalidating the
statute."'
The uselessness of this exception is illustrated by the total absence
of its application. To date, the Supreme Court has never sanctioned
federal intervention under this exception."' The exception has been
recognized only incidentially as the Court has tried to differentiate
between a flagrantly unconstitutional statute and a statute unconstitu-
tional on its face. 2' The continued worth of this exception has been
final analysis derived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought
before the courts for decision .... But this vital responsibility, broad as it is, does
not amount to an unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgment
on laws before the courts are called upon to enforce them. Ever since the Constitu-
tional Convention rejected a proposal for having members of the Supreme Court
render advice concerning pending legislation it has been clear that, even when suits
of this kind involve a "case or controversy" . . . the task of analyzing a proposed
statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary.
Id. at 52 (citation and footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
117. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
118. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
120. See Spears, The Supreme Court February Sextet; Younger v. Harris Revisited,
26 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 46-48 (1974).
121. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54.
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seriously questioned.'" Finally, the obstacles'" confronting the federal
petitioner in successfully invoking the protection of this exception
leaves little doubt but that the exception is illusory.
3. The Extraordinary Circumstances Exception
The final exception to the Younger abstention doctrine is actually a
general category that encompasses both of the previously discussed ex-
ceptions. Federal equitable relief may be granted to enjoin a pending
state proceeding in extraordinary circumstances which create the re-
quisite great and immediate irreparable injury."' In Younger the Court
expressly did not resolve the issue of what other types of situations
would create extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable
relief.11 Subsequently, the Court in Kugler v. Helfant.26 developed the
breadth of the concept by holding that a mere unusual factual situation
would not amount to extraordinary circumstances.'" The Kugler Court,
however, cited a prior case, Gibson v. Berryhill,'" for the proper ap-
plication of the general exception." In Gibson the federal plaintiffs
sought to enjoin a pending state administrative proceeding instituted
against them for unprofessional conduct. The Gibson Court noted that
the administrative board would benefit financially if the petitioners'
122. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Trainor, stated:
Today the Court seems to be saying that the "patently and flagrantly unconstitu-
tional" exception to Younger-type abstention is unavailable whenever a statute has
a legitimate title, or a legitimate severability clause, or some other equally in-
nocuous provision. If this is a fair reading of the Court's opinion, the Court has
given Mr. Justice Black's illustrative language definitional significance. In effect,
this treatment preserves an illusion of flexibility in the application of a Younger-
type abstention, but it actually eliminates one of the exceptions from the doctrine.
431 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also note 81 supra.
123. See notes 42-48 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 118-119
supra.
124. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53.
125. Id. at 54. The Court concluded that "[o]tber unusual situations calling for federal
intervention might also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify what
they might be." Id.
126. 421 U.S. 117 (1975).
127. Id. at 124-25. The Court stated:
The very nature of "extraordinary circumstances," of course, makes it impossible to
anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such
great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state
criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be
"extraordinary" in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for im-
mediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly
unusual factual situation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
128. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
129. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. at 125 n.4.
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licenses were suspended.' The majority reasoned that the board's
direct pecuniary interest in the matter rendered it incompetent to ad-
judicate the proceedings impartially and equated this bias with the
great and immediate irreparable injury justifying federal
intervention.'31
The Kugler Court's characterization of Gibson as an extraordinary
circumstance exception is questionable. A closer examination of the
Gibson Court's reasoning reveals that Younger principles were inap-
plicable in the first instance. The Younger abstention doctrine assumes
that the federal petitioner has an opportunity to vindicate his constitu-
tional guarantees in the pending state proceeding. 3' Accordingly, if the
opportunity does not exist in the state system because of judicial bias,
then Younger principles are not in force and there is no need to
evaluate the applicability of the Younger exceptions." That is, the in-
ability of the administrative board to ajudicate the suit impartially
foreclosed the opportunity to raise the federal claims in the state pro
ceedings.
Alternatively, if Younger principles were operative in Gibson, the
pecuniary interest of the board could have been handled under the bad
faith exception. The judicial bias of the board manifested an unwill-
ingness to adjudicate the dispute fairly which in turn showed insen-
sitivity to or neglect of its responsibilities." By refusing to perform its
duties, the administrative board is guilty of bad faith just as pros-
ecutors are when they fail to carry out their functions properly.3 Con-
sequently, the Gibson ruling is an artificial example of the general ex-
traordinary circumstances exception.
The Court's reasoning in recent decisions reflects an attitude of
restricting the scope of the general exception. In Trainor v. Her-
nandez" the Court found that prehearing seizure of property did not
create extraordinary circumstances or great and immediate irreparable
injury which would justify federal equitable relief.37 Similarly, in
Moore v. Sims"' the majority concluded that prehearing deprivation of
custody of the petitioners' children did not rise to the level of extraor-
130. 411 U.S. at 578-79.
131. Id. at 579-81.
132. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 337.
133. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 442 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Huff-
man v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 610-11.
134. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan,-J., dissenting).
See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 460-61.
135. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1903).
136. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). See note 39 supra.
137. 431 U.S. at 439-40.
138. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). See note 39 supra.
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dinary circumstances.139 The Moore Court was quick to point out that
the existence of extraordinary circumstances must be gauged at the
time federal intervention is sought.40 The petitioners in Moore had
regained custody of their children at that time. Although the majority
expressly refused to find that every attachment order issued to pro-
tect a child would constitute extraordinary circumstances, it did not
rule out the possibility of federal intervention if the petitioners were
without the custody of their children at the time the request for relief
was evaluated.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's continued practice
of limiting the scope of the extraordinary circumstances exception does
not indicate favorable prospects for relief in this area in the future.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A BALANCING OF COMPETING INTERESTS APPROACH
The Younger abstention doctrine is premised on the concepts of
comity and federalism which seek to strike a harmonious balance be-
tween the operation of the state and national governments.' Underly-
ing these fundamental notions is the idea that each system should
respect the proper funtions of the other.' Federalism entails a mutual
respect and each system must be willing to make concessions in order
to achieve a desirable middle ground. The difficulty arises when each
system is entrusted with the adjudication of federal claims. The
Supreme Court decisions, however, do not give proper weight to the
interests of the federal system."' The emphasis of the Younger line of
cases is on the state's interest while the national system's interest in
providing a forum for the vindication of constitutional rights is under-
valued.'
A suitable alternative would be to adopt a more flexible approach
which acknowledges and balances the competing interests involved.
The present policy with respect to pending state criminal prosecutions
should be retained to reflect the traditional importance attached to the
state's interest in maintaining the effectiveness of its criminal justice
139. 442 U.S. at 434.
140. Id. at 433.
141. Id. at 434. See Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973), affd, 414
U.S. 1139 (1974) (two day deprivation of parental custody prior to adversary hearing may
be sufficient to authorize federal intervention).
142. See note 3 supra.
143. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44 ("[comity means] a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways").
144. See note 88 supra.
145. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
1981
Duquesne Law Review
system.146 Further, the availability of the federal writ of habeas corpus
militates against the federal courts displacing the state forums in the
criminal area.1 7 The extension of Younger principles into the civil area
should be reevaluated with the aim of balancing the actual affront to
and disruption of the state system with the role of the federal courts
in vindicating constitutional guarantees. Federal intervention should
be permitted in instances where the state proceedings have not reached
the merits of the case. Under these conditions, the petitioner's choice
of forum should be honored if timely exercised. The affront to the
state system can be little more than that in a case removed under
statutory authority to a federal court.'48 The disruption of the state
system is lessened if the case is removed initially rather than after the
merits have been litigated. Additionally, the burden of proof should be
on the party advocating abstention to demonstrate the interference
with the proper functions of the state. Absent significant affront to
and disruption of the state system, the federal judiciary should not be
denied the opportunity to assume its role as primary guardian of
federal rights.149
V. CONCLUSION
The availability of federal equitable relief directed at threatened or
pending state proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine in-
volves an initial determination of the pendency of a state court action.
In the absence of a pending state proceeding, the notions of comity and
federalism attendant to Younger do not operate to preclude the grant-
ing of federal declaratory or injunctive relief, although these limited
forms of relief are tempered by jurisdictional requirements and the
Pullman abstention doctrine which seeks to avoid the unnecessary ad-
judication of constitutional issues where the case can be disposed of on
a question of state law interpreted by a state court. Once a state suit
is "pending" within the meaning of Hicks, the applicability of Younger
must be tested. The appropriateness of Younger principles to civil pro-
ceedings generally may be a foregone conclusion given the dispropor-
tionate weight attributed by the Supreme Court to the state's interest
in comparison to the national interest. If Younger principles are found
146. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
147. Appeal to the federal courts via habeas corpus would be as of right whereas in
civil cases, as contemplated by Huffman, it is discretionary. See text accompanying note
36 supra.
148. State civil cases are removable to federal court by the state defendant if the suit
could have originally been brought in a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
149. See Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Ra-
tionale, 63 COR. L. REv. 463, 488 (1978).
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to be in force, federal equitable relief can be granted only in extraor-
dinary circumstances which create great and immediate irreparable in-
jury. The Court's narrow interpretation of these exceptions forces the
petitioner to demonstrate that he is exposed to the risk of multiple
state prosecutions undertaken in bad faith or with the intent to harass
him.
The Younger abstention doctrine does leave room for the increased
availability of federal equitable relief based on the avenues open to the
Court to sanction federal intervention.'0 The Court may restrict the
broad application of the Younger abstention doctrine by adopting a
balancing of competing interests approach. The purpose of section 1983
and the role of the federal judiciary in vindicating individual constitu-
tional liberties may tip the scales in favor of federal intervention.
Finally, the scope and frequency of the recognized exceptions to the
Younger abstention doctrine may be increased in future decisions. The
extraordinary circumstances exception may be given a clearer defini-
tion which would include a variety of situations in which federal in-
junctive relief would be proper.'51 In view of the Supreme Court's re-
cent trend to curtail the accessibility of the federal forum, however, it
does not appear that any significant increase in federal intervention is
likely to occur in the immediate future.
David C. Levenreich
150. Comment, "Our Federalism"-The Limitation of Younger-Samuels and their Pro-
geny on Federal Intervention in State Court Proceedings, 42 Mo. L. REv. 559, 572 (1977).
151. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975) ("The very nature of 'extraor-
dinary circumstances,' of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situa-
tion that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury
as to warrant intervention into state criminal proceedings").
1981

